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Abstract
There has been a recent revival of black aesthetics
unprecedented since the 1960s. Some is happening inside
academic philosophy, including in this journal (Volume 7, 2009).
But there are more examples of black esthetics across other
disciplines. A key, controversial concept in transdisciplinary
black aesthetics is autonomy. Modern Western aesthetics was
racist when it was established in the eighteenth century because
blacks were not considered to be capable of autonomy,
necessary to have taste. Now that this anti-black racism has
been exposed, but until critics are convinced that aesthetics
today is free of such racism, autonomy will be viewed as an
ideological disguise for racism and even black aesthetics will be
under suspicion. Simon Gikandi details the anti-black racism of
early aesthetics yet argues at the same time that there was a
black counter-aesthetic enacting its relative autonomy. I show
that relative autonomy is enacted throughout modern and
contemporary black art and aesthetics.
Key Words
autonomy; black aesthetics; Black Arts Movement; essentialism;
race; resistance; taste
“Some view our sable race with scornfuleye,
‘Their colour is a diabolic die.’
Remember, Christians, Negroes,black as Cain,
May be re n’d, and join th’ angelic train.”
—Phillis Wheatley[1]
1. Introduction
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Black aesthetics today resides well outside what might be
assumed to be its home discipline of philosophy and is soundly
transdisciplinary, drawing on the conceptual resources of many
other disciplines, including Africana studies, art history,
comparative literature, history, musicology, performance
studies, and more. For example, recognizing that black
aesthetics has migrated, if it ever had a home
in philosophy, Paul Taylor’s explicit aim in his recent Black is
Beautiful: The Philosophy of Black Aesthetics is “to build a bridge
from a particular network of discursive communities
[philosophy]…to the mainland of inquiry into black
aesthetics.”[2] Transdisciplinary black aesthetics convenes many
disciplines in the e orts to explore and express the aesthetic
dimension of the history of black experiences in the U.S. (and
elsewhere), including slavery, mass incarceration, police
violence, and the ongoing ght for black civil rights.
However, the involvement of aesthetics in these e orts is
philosophically and politically complicated because some of the
leading gures in early modern Western aesthetics, such as
Hume and Kant, promulgated racist beliefs. For example, they
proclaimed the universality of taste or aesthetic judgment while
contradictorily denying that blacks had the capability for
autonomy requisite for taste or judgment. Cornel West makes
this contradiction explicit and argues that it is constitutive of
aesthetics: “the very structure of modern discourse at its
inception produced forms of…aesthetic and cultural ideals
which require the constitution of the idea of white
supremacy.”[3] Autonomy is one of these ideals, so if blacks are
denied autonomy, they are excluded from aesthetics.[4] While
contemporary aestheticians would presumably accept at least a
measured version of West’s critique and distance themselves
from Kant’s and Hume’s racist beliefs, the lingering concern,
recently voiced by Lewis Gordon, is that aesthetics may still be
racist today or at least haunted by such suspicions: “A problem
with constructing black aesthetics is whether aesthetics has
been so colonized that its production would be a form of
colonizing instead of decolonizing practice.”[5]
Black aesthetics today needs to be assured of its relative
autonomy from racist aesthetics in order to ourish as, among
other things, a critical transdisciplinary practice against antiblack racism. If aesthetic autonomy, relative or otherwise, still
embodies any traces of racism, if it is denied to blacks, or if the
enactment of their capability for relative autonomy is
constrained in principle, we can only conclude that aesthetics
remains racist. Given this specter of racism, black aesthetics has
struggled with the concept of autonomy. At the same time, black
artists and theorists have re-appropriated the concept, starting
when they arrived in the new world on slave ships, making the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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concept their own, too.[6] Thus, as I will argue, relative
autonomy is a central concept enacted throughout modern and
contemporary transdisciplinary black aesthetics. Speaking of
poetry in particular, the poet and theorist Evie Shockley
succinctly captures the meaning of relative autonomy here,
which I think is apposite in all the arts and in black aesthetics: “a
mode of writing adopted by African American poets in their
e orts to work within, around, or against the constraint of being
read and heard as ‘black.'”[7] Following the lead of art, black
aesthetics is relatively autonomous from anti-black racism and,
as such, is a mode of resistance to it that, in the spirit of
autonomy, takes many di erent forms.[8]
2. Gikandi and the racism of early modern Western aesthetics
Simon Gikandi’s Slavery and the Culture of Taste is both a
damning and a constructive critique of aesthetics in the
eighteenth century. He argues that aesthetics was racist in its
origins but does so without rejecting aesthetics all together, for
he believes we would then lose sight of the long-standing as well
as current forms of black aesthetics that have been largely
buried—invisibilized—in the history of aesthetics. Gikandi
analyzes, in a detailed way, how the acceptance of slavery, even
among the seemingly most enlightened thinkers of the
eighteenth century, was inscribed into the discursive origins of
modern Western aesthetics.[9] His argument is not merely that
slavery and taste were in tension as “nonidentical twins,” as he
characterizes their relationship, “intimately connected even
when they were structurally construed to be radical
opposites.”[10] He also argues that modern aesthetics became
an ideological cover for slavery, expressing seemingly
enlightened ideas about universal taste while countenancing
chattel slavery. Gikandi’s argument is damning for aesthetics.
[11] Speaking of racism within the foundations of American
democracy, in 1861 Frederick Douglass, once a slave himself,
o ered no less of a damning perspective on the legacy of the
similarly “nonidentical twins” of American democracy and
racism: “Banish from your minds the last lingering shadow of a
hope that your government can ever rest secure on a mixed
basis of freedom and slavery.”[12]
However, there is another, equally important part of Gikandi’s
Slavery and the Culture of Taste that helps to counter the view
of modern Western aesthetics as mere ideology without
whitewashing it. Gikandi also argues that slaves had their own
taste, evidenced by the literature, music, poetry, and the like
they created: “the site in which the black body was imprisoned”
was also “the conduit for its liberation,” creating a
counterculture of taste.[13] As Alain Locke argues, in the early
twentieth century, “even ordinary living has epic depth and lyric
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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intensity” for people under social pressure and “this, their
material handicap, is their spiritual advantage.”[14] In the same
vein, Achille Mbembe emphasizes the importance of art for
slaves: “For communities whose history has long been one of
debasement and humiliation, religious and artistic creation has
often represented the nal defense against the forces of
dehumanization.”[15] In a more dialectical and historically
detailed manner, Saidiya Hartman argues that slaves developed
their own forms of song and dance even while they were being
forced to perform for their masters, compounding the “pleasure
of terror” with the “terror of pleasure.” Moreover, slaves
simultaneously enacted forms of resistance to slavery, “puttin’
on ole massa” while carrying out their demands.[16]
To overlook, deny, or under appreciate the slave counterculture
of taste is, according to Gikandi, to be complicitous with racism,
for it is to assume that slaves were incapable of taste,
con rming the racist belief that they were subhuman that was
used to justify slavery. That is, it was believed that slaves did not
manifest European taste, therefore they were subhuman, as
Europeans, and Americans mimicking their old-world
counterparts, fancied themselves the standard bearers of
humanity and of taste. Allegedly being subhuman, black slaves
could not have any other mode of taste, for only humans have
taste. One insistent, if often subtle, way for slaves to assert their
humanity was to express their own taste, even if it was not
recognized as such by slaveholders or others. In W. E. B. Du
Bois’s words: “until the art of the black folk compels recognition
they will not be rated as human.”[17] Once again, Douglass
presages the spirit of Gikandi’s argument here, for there is
another side of his argument, too, at least regarding taste: “The
process by which man is able to invent his own subjective
consciousness into the objective form, considered in all its
range, is in truth the highest attribute of man’s nature. All that is
really peculiar to humanity…proceeds from this one faculty or
power.”[18] Despite the odds, slaves enacted their relative
autonomy to invent their own “subjective consciousness into the
objective form.” In such circumstances, one task of black
aesthetics is to articulate and analyze the presuppositions of the
counterculture of taste, such as relative autonomy.[19] In short,
Gikandi’s book is important because it covers all of this
controversial philosophical, moral, and political terrain and still
makes a powerful case for the critical relevance of aesthetics
today, helping to secure the relative autonomy of black
aesthetics.
3. Black arts movement and black aesthetics
If modern Western aesthetics was racist in its origins, how is it
possible to enlist aesthetics to recognize the counterculture of
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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taste that began at the same time, if not earlier? How can we
best understand the counterculture of taste and aesthetics
practiced among slaves who were entrapped in the Middle
Passage slave routes that deterritorized their indigenous taste
and aesthetics? I invite you to read more of Gikandi to see how
he answers these questions by arguing that slaves initiated their
own aesthetics by relying on a ruin or fragment, for example, a
drum, that embodied both their connection and disconnection
to Africa, as “only the fragmentary and incomplete had the
capacity to denote the doubleness that was the mark of African
identities in the new world,” another iteration of Du Bois’s
concept of “double consciousness.”[20] Instead, I want to jump
from the eighteenth century to the 1960s, when the Black Arts
Movement (1965-1975) and a contemporary conception of
“black aesthetics” emerged in the U.S., as it is a way to see how
black theorists have addressed these questions in
contemporary terms. Are they satis ed that aesthetics today is
relatively autonomous from its racist past? If their own theories
presuppose the relative autonomy of aesthetics, as I will argue,
the answer is a rmative.
The black aesthetics of the 1960s, honored recently with its own
display in the new National Museum of African American History
and Culture in Washington, D. C., received its iconic expression
in Amiri Baraka’s 1965 poem, “Black Art,” which ends as follows:
“…We want a black poem. And a
Black World.
Let the world be a Black Poem
And Let All Black People Speak This Poem
Silently
or LOUD.”[21]
Seen in the context of the struggle for civil rights, the Black Arts
Movement has often been understood as the aesthetic and
spiritual sister of black power and thus has been seen largely as
an aesthetic resistance movement. For example, Larry Neal,
author of the 1968 manifesto of the Black Arts Movement,
argues that black art is concerned with the relationship between
art and politics, and black power with the art of politics. At the
same time, Neal is radical in his assessment of the relationship
of the black aesthetics to modern Western aesthetics: “the
Western aesthetic has run its course; it is impossible to
construct anything meaningful within its decaying structures.
We advocate a cultural revolution in art and ideas.”[22] To
achieve the goal of creating art that speaks directly to the needs
and aspirations of black America, he advocates that black artists
develop “a separate symbolism, mythology, critique, and
iconology.”[23] Similarly, and more recently, Amy Ongiri argues
that the Black Arts Movement “linked the articulation of the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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radical political ethos of Black Power to a radically
transformative culture of oppositional creativity,” linking black
experiences with black aesthetics, overthrowing existing cultural
norms and creating new ones.[24] Black aesthetics would thus
seem to imply aesthetic as well as political separatism.
Moreover, each form of separatism implies relative autonomy,
as each asserts that anti-black racism will not de ne black
identity.

3.1 Blacks arts movement and essentialism
However, a number of theorists more recently argue that the
Black Arts Movement has been too narrowly, if not wrongly,
interpreted in at least two ways. First, the Black Arts Movement
was not essentialist. The essentialist claim arose from
interpretations of the separatism advocated by Neal and others,
and it would seem to restrict, if not undermine, the relative
autonomy of black aesthetics, limiting it to a xed notion of
blackness. That is, the separatist nationalist politics implied a
separatist aesthetics that, in turn, was often thought to
presuppose an essentialist notion of “the” black aesthetic to
resist the conception of modern Western aesthetics that
fashioned itself to be universal when, in fact, it was racist. But, to
be clear, Neal already challenged this kind of interpretation,
arguing that even though black aesthetics is tied to black power,
it does not have a static essence, for black power itself “has no
one speci c meaning. It is rather…a kind of emotional response
to one’s history. …it can ultimately be de ned only…through
actions, be they artistic or political.”[25] So, “separatism” does
not necessarily entail “essentialism.”
Yet the specter of essentialism seems to linger around, if not
within, black aesthetics, as it concerns the meaning of
“blackness” at the heart of black aesthetics, which, in turn,
impacts the scope, if not the possibility, of its relative autonomy.
To address this concern, several contemporary theorists have
explicitly disavowed essentialism in black aesthetics. For
example, Michelle Wright rejects essentialism in The Physics of
Blackness: Beyond the Middle Passage Epistemology, where she
asks what it means to be black, given that “blackness” is not
biological in origin but socially and discursively constructed.[26]
If blackness is constructed, its meaning changes over time and
space: “in any moment in which we are reading/analyzing
Blackness, we should assume that its valences will likely vary
from those of a previous moment.”[27] Somewhat echoing and
supplementing Nelson Goodman’s de nition of art as being
about “when is art” rather than “what is art,” Wright argues that
although blackness is commonly de ned as a “what,” it instead
operates more as a “when” and, even better, as a “where.”
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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Bringing discourses about space-time in physics into
conversation with artworks embodying the African diaspora,
Wright then engages in an intersectionalist analysis (race, class,
gender, sexuality) of bodies too frequently excluded from
contemporary mainstream aesthetics: black feminists, black
queers, recent black African immigrants to the West, and blacks
whose histories may weave in and out of the Middle Passage
epistemology but do not cohere to it. Wright explores how
Middle Passage epistemology subverts racist assumptions about
blackness, yet its linear structure inhibits the kind of inclusive
epistemology of blackness needed in the twenty- rst century.
The critique of essentialism thus opens up a new methodology
for black aesthetics along with new content, establishing a basis
for enacting the relative autonomy of black aesthetics on two
levels.
Similarly, Shockley eschews “racial essentialism” in Renegade
Poetics: Black Aesthetics and Formal Innovation in African
American Poetry, demonstrating again how the critique of
essentialism leads to clari cation of the methodology and
content of black aesthetics. She argues that the term ‘black
aesthetics’ “need not be inevitably linked to static
understandings of how blackness is inscribed in literary texts,”
such as the poetry of Sonia Sanchez, a key poet of the Black Arts
Movement. Accordingly, Shockley argues for a descriptive rather
than prescriptive conception of black aesthetics, and she is
precise about the object of description: ‘black’ is meant neither
to describe the characteristics or qualities of texts nor to refer
speci cally to the socially constructed race of the writer.[28]
Rather, black aesthetics describes the kinds of “subjectivity
produced by the experience of identifying or being interpolated
as ‘black’ in the U.S.—actively working out a poetics in the
context of a racist society.”[29] Blacks regularly experience being
contingently interpolated as black but, Shockley adds, they are
not essentially black as a result of any manner in which they are
interpolated, as that would make the racist interpolation a
permanent racist reality. The di erence here is between the
space of freedom—relative autonomy—and the art, culture, and
aesthetics it makes possible. It is not that blacks are relatively
autonomous and then engage in art, culture, and aesthetics to
express their autonomy. Rather, they materially realize their
capability for relative autonomy by engaging in artistic, cultural,
and aesthetic practices, partly in response to the ways they are
interpolated as black. In Shockley’s words, quoted earlier, black
aesthetics refers “to a mode of writing adopted by African
American poets in their e orts to work within, around, or
against the constraint of being read and heard as ‘black’.”[30] In
e ect, she is asserting the relative autonomy of blacks to engage
in art and aesthetics without being perceived, interpreted, or
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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interpolated as black.[31] At the same time, the methodological
implication of Shockley’s appeal to experience is that black
aesthetics is “contingent, and must be historicized and
contextualized with regard to period and place, and with regard
to the various other factors that shape the writer’s identity,
particularly including gender, sexuality, and class.”[32] Thus,
black aesthetics is methodologically both intersectional and
transdisciplinary in an e ort to understand how blackness is
objectively produced, subjectively experienced, and objectively
expressed.[33]

3.2 Black Arts Movement and resistance
The second way that the Black Arts Movement has often been
narrowly interpreted is that, even if black art is a form of
resistance to the racist claim that blacks lack the capability to
create art, its forms of resistance comprise more varied and
indirect aesthetic strategies than some interpreters in the past
have acknowledged. For example, literary and Africana theorist
Kevin Quashie argues, in The Sovereignty of Quiet: Beyond
Resistance in Black Culture, that the tendency to see direct
resistance as the only framework for blackness is itself racist,
because it sees blackness only through a public social lens as if
there were no inner black life.[34] That is, any reduction of the
aesthetics of the Black Arts Movement, or any form or period of
black art, to “resistance aesthetics” would make it inseparable
from racist aesthetics, which in e ect would be tantamount to
denying there is any black art or aesthetics, as Gikandi also
argues.[35] For example, although slaves were oppressed by the
ideology of aesthetics covering for the racism at the heart of
American and French revolutions and democracies, among
others, slaves did not accept racist taste but nor did they merely
resist racist taste. Rather, they chose instead to develop new
forms of taste and corresponding forms of aesthetics, aiming to
assert their own identity rather than accept or directly resist the
identity imposed on them by the slave owners. Jeremy Glick
makes a similar argument while analyzing the art and aesthetics
that emerged during the Haitian revolution, happening at
roughly the same time as the American and French revolutions.
[36] Encompassing the historical period covered earlier by
Gikandi, Haiti provides a geographical site for the formation of a
new aesthetics along with a new, if short-lived, democracy. In
e ect, Haiti embodied the rst large-scale, aesthetic-political
enactment of black aesthetics of the type Wright, Shockley, and
others have proposed, and it thus potentially provides a better
way of understanding the black aesthetics of the Black Arts
Movement and, by extension, black aesthetics today.
If we then ask what other purposes or capabilities besides direct
resistance inform black art and aesthetics, Quashie’s answer is
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/

8/20

10/5/2020

https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/

to “rethink expressiveness,” much as Taylor proposes, as we will
see below.[37] Quashie sees “quiet” as “a metaphor for the full
range of one’s inner life—one’s desires, ambitions, hungers,
vulnerabilities, fears. The inner life is not apolitical nor without
social value, but neither is it determined entirely by
publicness.”[38] For example, remember the iconic image of U.S.
track athletes, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, raising their
black-gloved sts while receiving gold and bronze medals,
respectively, at the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City. Quashie
portrays the prayer-like quietude of their stance: their eyes were
closed, heads bowed, and they wore no shoes in solidarity with
poor black Americans. Here, and more generally, an aesthetic of
quietude entails “a black expressiveness. …a black subject in the
undisputed dignity of its humanity.” “In humanity, quiet is our
dignity,” which is imaginary and material.[39] At the same time,
quiet expressiveness is a form of relatively autonomous agency
“shaped by the spirituality of being human” that, as Douglass
argues, is “the wellspring for art and culture.”[40]
In a related vein, the philosopher and activist Angela Y. Davis
defends “softness” as a key aesthetic distinct from but
complementary to direct resistance. She developed several
examples during her keynote address at Open Engagement, an
annual art and activism conference held in 2016 in Oakland.
One example was the uno cial but widely recognized antiApartheid anthem, Mannenberg, composed by Adbullah
Ibrahim (aka Dollar Brand), a South African jazz musician.[41]
Nelson Mandela reportedly said that he could feel the
imminence of liberation when he secretly listened to it while still
in prison, a liberation whose anthem was soft even as it was
heard around the world. Davis’s second example for clarifying
“soft aesthetics” was the poster created for the 1998 inaugural
conference of Critical Resistance, a prison abolition movement
based in Oakland. She said there was a tempestuous internal
debate at the time about the aesthetics of the poster. While the
initially favored aesthetic view was that the poster should depict
images of chains or prison cells, Davis argued that, if people saw
such images, they might conclude they already knew what the
conference was about—oppressive prisons—and think they did
not need to attend. Instead, the artist Rupert Garcia created an
alternative to the aesthetics of resistance, depicting an eye on
the horizon that appears both as menacing as ubiquitous
surveillance and as hopeful as a Californian sunrise. Instead of
the expected audience of 350 people for whom the organizers
prepared, over 3,500 people attended, mostly as a result of the
poster, Davis claimed, because they were as interested in
imagination as resistance, recognizing that critical thinking and
imagination—aesthetics—are allies in the ght for social justice,
as they enact visions of possible ways of living more justly. In
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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elaborating on these claims, Davis argues that despite Kant’s
racist shortcomings, he o ers key conceptual tools for
defending the importance of the imagination in criminal justice
struggles. For example, beauty is the symbol of morality, which
Davis nds compelling, as she defends the necessity of black
imagination within prison aesthetics.[42]
Another alternative to a narrowly conceived aesthetics of
resistance within black art is articulated by Fred Moten and
Stefano Harney through their concept of the “undercommons.”
This concept invokes a largely parallel autonomous culture,
though one that, at times, intersects with mainstream white
culture in the U.S. “We owe it to each other to falsify the
institution, to make politics incorrect, to give the lie to our own
determination. We owe each other the indeterminate.”[43] The
idea of the undercommons is critically, culturally, and politically
rich because it locates black imagination in the here and now
and does not worry about recognition by the powers that be, so
long as they are white and racist. At the same time, the
undercommons seems to imply an aesthetic withdrawal from
politics and even from society. In Moten and Harney’s words:
“An abdication of political responsibility? OK. Whatever. We’re
just anti-politically romantic about actually existing social life.
We aren’t responsible for politics. We are the general
antagonism to politics looming outside every attempt to
politicise,…. We are disruption and consent to disruption.”[44]
Mbembe’s critique of black reason indirectly clari es such a
withdrawal and what it entails, as it implies a shift from an
“identity judgment” of blacks by whites (“Who is he”?) to a
“declaration of identity” by blacks (“Who am I?”).[45] That is,
much as Gikandi and others have proposed a shift from directly
resisting the denial of black taste to enacting black taste, the
withdrawal is the enactment of relative autonomy.
The concept of the “undercommons” is new, but the withdrawal
and relative autonomy it enacts are part of a long-standing
tradition in black aesthetics. Besides being reminiscent of the
separatism proposed by Neal and others in the Black Arts
Movement in the 1960s, the undercommons is not unlike
Langston Hughes’s view expressed back in 1926, during the
Harlem Renaissance: “We younger Negro artists who create now
intend to express our individual dark-skinned selves without
fear or shame. If white people are pleased we are glad. If they
are not, it does not matter. We know we are beautiful. And ugly
too. The tom-tom cries and the tom-tom laughs. If colored
people are pleased we are glad. If they are not, their displeasure
doesn’t matter either.”[46] Again, an aesthetic is advanced that
neither accepts nor directly resists the dominant culture, setting
up what could be called a parallel aesthetic state. At issue here
is again the enactment of relative autonomy from the very world
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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that denies autonomy to blacks, albeit without regard to
whether that world recognizes the enactment (even without
regard to whether other blacks recognize it).[47] Hughes
continues: “We build our temples for tomorrow, strong as we
know how, and we stand top of the mountain, free within
ourselves.”[48] Arguably, the enactment is not often recognized
precisely because it presupposes relative autonomy, for to
recognize the enactment is to recognize blacks’ relative
autonomy.
The very idea of a black aesthetic withdrawal presupposes the
relative autonomy of art, one of the cornerstones of modern
aesthetics, for any such withdrawal implies that blacks qua
artists are relatively free from the conditions from which they
have withdrawn. Free in withdrawing, free once having
withdrawn. Autonomy is thus tied to, if not equivalent to,
freedom.
4. Relative autonomy of black aesthetics
The presupposition of relative autonomy on the part of blacks
engaging in art while experiencing racism has a history in black
aesthetics, as we have seen already, con rming and sustaining
the possibility of what Gikandi calls the counterculture of taste.
For example, Locke o ers, in the 1920s, a similar account of the
relatively autonomous aesthetics of the Harlem Renaissance as
it was emerging: “race expression does not need to be
deliberate to be vital. Indeed at its best it never is.” Such work is
“racially expressive” without being “racially rhetorical.” In fact, in
taking “their material objectively with detached artistic vision,”
the “newer motive…in being racial is to be so purely for the sake
of art,” which could not be a stronger avowal of art’s relative
autonomy, though I would prefer “relatively” to “purely.”[49] The
motivating idea here is “to evolve from the racial substance
something technically distinctive, something that as an idiom of
style may become a contribution to the general resources of
art,” resulting in a “new aesthetic.”[50]
Similarly, Richard Wright, author of Native Son, later invoked the
concept of autonomy when he explained his concept of
“perspective,” which, in turn, is related to the contemporary
concept of perspective (or standpoint). [51] However, whereas
the concept of perspective today seems to entail a lack of
autonomy from social reality, as perspective is thought to be
what embeds individuals “in” reality and gives them authenticity,
Wright understands perspective as the functional, professional
“autonomy” of an artist’s craft that makes it possible for the
perspective to be communicated and possibly be recognized.
That is, perspective is “that part of a poem, novel, or play which
a writer never puts directly upon paper” but “where a writer
stands to view the struggles, hopes, and su erings of his
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/black-aesthetics-and-relative-autonomy/
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people.”[52] At the same time, autonomous artists “should seek
through the medium of their craft to play as meaningful a role in
the a airs of men as do other professionals.”[53] Through the
exercise of their autonomous writing, artists are “being called
upon to do no less than create values by which [their] race is to
struggle, live and die.” As was the case with Davis among others,
this position is di erent from but complementary to direct
resistance. For Wright o ers what he sees as a necessary
alternative to Negro writers’, as he called them back in the
1930s, being “a sort of conspicuous consumption” for white
society as though they were “French poodles who do clever
tricks” or who plead “with White America for justice.”[54]
However, while a number of writers and theorists instrumental
in the development of black aesthetics over the last century
have relied on some conception of the relative autonomy of art,
autonomy may still be considered suspect by some people
working in black aesthetics today. How, for example, can blacks
possibly be even relatively autonomous from the lived
experiences of racism in the U.S. today that, in part, constitute
blackness and that, in turn, partly constitutes art as black? Even
relative autonomy could seem to some to be an ideological
expectation that is cruel if it can never be met, because it seems
tied to disinterestedness and disinterest seems to imply
disrespecting the very interests constituting the “black” in black
aesthetics and thereby whitewashing racism, the object of black
aesthetics resistance. Yet autonomy is the very thing racism
denies blacks. In turn, that denial is the reason why many black
writers and theorists defend autonomy—not for the sake of art,
as Wright puts it, but rather for the sake of blacks. To enact
relative autonomy through art is one mode of resistance to antiblack racism.
A recent example of the avowal of relative autonomy as a mode
of resistance is the “aesthetic radicalism” strategy proposed by
GerShun Avilez in Radical Aesthetics and Modern Black
Nationalism.[55] The strategy is to practice black aesthetics by
engaging in “disruptive inhabiting” of racist aesthetics in
connection with black nationalism and artistic experimentalism,
combined with intersectional theory, queer theory (queer of
color critique), and critical race theory—transdisciplinary and
intersectional black aesthetics.[56] The goal of Avilez’s strategy
of disruptive inhibiting of aesthetics is to liberate the potential
inactive within historically racist aesthetics, as Gikandi
constructively proposed earlier, and as Mbembe also argues:
“the anthropological and political foundation of classic Black art”
is the “hope for the liberation of hidden or forgotten energies,
the hope for an ultimate reversal of visible and invisible
powers.”[57] Avilez’s disruptive strategy clearly presupposes
relative autonomy, for the potential hidden within racist
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aesthetics needs to be relatively autonomous from racist
aesthetics in order to survive before it can be liberated, and
once it is liberated, it must remain relatively autonomous or risk
returning to its prior state of near oblivion or be complicitous
with racism. So long as black aesthetics requires some distance
or withdrawal from social and empirical reality in order to
function, then relative autonomy is presupposed, even when the
primary goal is disruption.
Ralph Ellison captures the idea of relative autonomy as a
condition for resistance to anti-black racism when, in the 1950s,
he introduces the “as if” modality of art: “while ction is but a
form of symbolic action, a mere game of ‘as if’, therein lies its
true function and its potential for e ecting change. For at its
most serious, just as is true of politics at its best, it is a thrust
toward a human ideal. And it approaches that ideal by a subtle
process of negating the world of things as given in favor of a
complex of man-made positives.”[58] That is, art’s “as if” status—
an assertion of its relative autonomy from the status quo—is at
the same time the basis for art’s criticality and resistance, albeit
from the standpoint of a poetic withdrawal.
To return to Taylor’s Black is Beautiful: A Philosophy of Black
Aesthetics, he, too, indirectly assumes the relative autonomy of
aesthetics in his characterization of black aesthetics. He argues
that to practice black aesthetics is “to use art, criticism, or
analysis to explore the role that expressive objects and practices
play in creating and maintaining black life-worlds.”[59] He
clari es his philosophical terms as follows: “blackness” is a racial
condition; constructed, a human artifact, but socially and
phenomenologically real, as Michelle Wright argues. Accordingly,
the ‘black’ in “black aesthetics” refers, as Shockley similarly
claims, to “people who have been racially positioned as black,
and to the life-worlds that these people have constructed.”[60]
Here, “black expressive culture” is de ned by “the aesthetic
objects, performances, and traditions that de ned blackness for
many people as surely and as imperfectly as skin color or hair
texture do.”[61] This account of expressiveness presupposes
relative autonomy because artists or everyday folks creating
forms of expression have to be autonomous enough to create,
especially if what they are expressing is in response, if not
resistance, to the way they have been racially positioned. They
are not merely expressing that they have been racially
positioned, for they are also expressing themselves in ways that
such positioning precludes. In Avilez’s terms, they are disrupting
the prevailing racist aesthetics and creating black aesthetics.
There is a negative turn here, which Taylor does not advocate
but which his analysis invites, that what artists and everyday
folks express is also the seeming impossibility of their creating
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black aesthetics that is not shaped by the ways they have been
racially positioned. In Fumi Okiji’s words, in Jazz as Critique:
Adorno and Black Expression Revisited, “black expressive work
cannot help but shed light on black life’s (im)possibilities.”[62]
That is, the disruption may entail creating new forms of
expression or new identities but, to some extent, so long as
racism prevails, they are also expressing the seeming
impossibility of fully expressing new forms. Expressiveness
entails disruption and, while both presuppose the relative
autonomy of art and aesthetics, they also represent the seeming
impossibility of even relative autonomy at present. This negative
moment accounts, in part, for the rejection of aesthetics within
black cultural studies, as it accounts for the seeming
impossibility of a nonracist aesthetics even while black
aesthetics disrupts racism and imagines a new aesthetics. This
negative moment helps to clarify the relativity of relative
autonomy without undermining it. But it is also what drives
black aesthetics forward. Black aesthetics is a demand for
relative autonomy that has been deferred and thus denied and,
at the same time, it is an enactment of relative autonomy
through a withdrawal from the societal conditions denying
autonomy. Put in stronger terms, relatively autonomous art and
aesthetics are themselves forms of resistance to racism, for they
imagine possible alternatives to racism, as Davis argued earlier.
Relative autonomy is only one concept in black aesthetics but it
is a pivotal one because it is hard to imagine how black
aesthetics could ever have got o the ground without it. Instead
of being construed as a barrier between philosophical aesthetics
and black aesthetics, because the former has a history of
denying autonomy to blacks knowing full well that it is a
condition for the possibility of taste, relative autonomy can
actually be part of the structure of the bridge that Taylor and
others are trying to build between philosophy and other
disciplines engaged in black aesthetics. Perhaps if the concept of
relative autonomy is now recognized across all disciplines,
Taylor will no longer need to worry that black aesthetics as a
whole “remains at a somewhat greater distance” than he would
like “from the philosophical resources” that he values.[63] My
goal here has been to show that many black artists and theorists
have defended the relative autonomy of art and aesthetics,
thereby drawing on a key philosophical, conceptual resource
and expanding the prospects of transdisciplinary black
aesthetics.
Michael Kelly
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